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Highlights of the paper  
How strategic are children and adolescents? Experimental evidence from normal-form 
games 
 
 We examine the strategic sophistication of teenagers, aged 10 to 17 years. 
 Subjects play two-person normal-form games. 
 We elicit choices, first-order beliefs and second-order beliefs. 
 Strategic sophistication does not change with age. 







We examine the strategic sophistication of 196 children and adolescents, aged 10 to 17 years, 
in experimental normal-form games. Besides choices, we also elicit first- and second-order 
beliefs. The share of subjects playing Nash or expecting opponents to play Nash is fairly 
stable across all age groups. The likelihood of playing best response to own beliefs increases 
in math skills. Using a mixture model, about 40% of subjects are classified as a strategic type, 
while the others are non-strategic. The distribution of types is somewhat changing with age. 
The estimated error rates also show some dependency on age and gender.  
JEL-classification: C72, C91 
Keywords: Strategic thinking, beliefs, experiment, age, adolescents 
 
This version: 2 January 2016 
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1. Introduction 
Standard game theory is an important pillar of research in economics, and more generally 
in the social sciences, since it provides a tool to analyze strategic interaction, like interaction 
in markets, bargaining, or in social dilemma situations. In this framework strategic 
sophistication refers to the extent to which a decision maker takes the partners’ possible 
actions in a strategic situation into account and consequently chooses an optimal strategy for 
herself (Crawford et al., 2013). Strategic sophistication is therefore considered as 
advantageous for a decision maker when interacting with others. 
Interestingly, numerous previous studies with adult decision makers have shown that the 
ability to act strategically is often limited (see, e.g., Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995; Haruvy et 
al., 1999; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Weizsäcker, 2003; Bhatt and Camerer, 2005; Crawford 
and Iriberri, 2007; Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008; Rey-Biel, 2009; Danz et al., 2012; 
Sutter et al., 2013). The frequently observed failure to behave strategically in a sophisticated 
way is typically blamed on an ignorance of other players’ incentives and their rationality 
(Costa-Gomes et al., 2001, Weizsäcker, 2003) or on a lack of consistency in best-responding 
with one’s actions to own first-order-beliefs. For instance, Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker 
(2008) report the latter failure to happen in about fifty percent of cases (in an experiment with 
university students). While the literature on strategic sophistication has developed models to 
explain this surprisingly large degree of bounded rationality (see Crawford et al., 2013, for a 
recent survey), it has largely remained silent on the development of strategic sophistication 
with age. Given the high degree of non-strategic behavior of adults in strategic interaction 
games, one might wonder how children and adolescents act in such situations. 
In his textbook on behavioral game theory, Camerer (2003, p. 66) notes that the behavior 
of children is often “closer to the self-interest prediction of game theory than virtually any 
adult population”. This would imply more equilibrium play of younger subjects. One should 
note, however, that equilibrium play need not be identical to strategic sophistication, 
especially in situations of a prisoners’ dilemma in which cooperation of both players may 
result in a Pareto superior outcome. Moreover, it does not follow immediately from 
Camerer’s statement that younger subjects also might have a better anticipation of their 
opponent’s behavior and thus be more sophisticated in strategic interaction. From a 
developmental psychology point of view, one might actually favor the following conjecture: 
If one subscribes to the view that children and adolescents need to learn through education 
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and socialization how to behave strategically in human interaction (a view suggested by 
developmental psychology; Kail and Cavanaugh, 2010), then one would expect to see a 
positive influence of age on the level of strategic sophistication. Given opposing conjectures, 
this issue is open for empirical investigation. 
In this paper, we present an experiment with 196 children and adolescents, aged 10 to 17 
years. They have to make decisions in 18 different normal-form games that have been 
designed by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) to study strategic sophistication. These games have 
been designed with different levels of complexity (various patterns of iterated dominance and 
unique pure-strategy equilibria without dominance). This complexity allows a fine-grained 
estimation of strategic and non-strategic types, explained in more detail below. Hence, this 
design improves on previous papers on children’s ability to play games in general. For 
instance, Brosig-Koch et al. (2015) study the development of the ability to use backward 
induction in simple games. They study the behavior of 6- to 23-year old subjects in a race 
game where backward induction is necessary to find out the winning strategy. In fact, before 
the teenage years, children improve on the ability to apply backward induction, an ability that 
is useful in playing the normal-form games used in this paper. However, Brosig-Koch et al. 
(2015) are not able – nor was it their intention – to examine the distribution of strategic and 
non-strategic types in playing normal-form games. We are also not so much interested in the 
question whether teenagers play these games as adults do (although we draw a few 
comparisons further down the line). This is something which, for example, work in 
psychology has addressed. Weller et al. (2012) show that 10 to 11 year olds make similar 
decisions as adults in a variety of contexts (like in sunk cost tasks or in the perception of risk), 
but their work does not focus on how choices, first- and second-order beliefs relate to each 
other and what follows from that for the level of strategic sophistication in playing interactive 
games. Moreover, they do not provide an estimation of the relative frequency of strategic and 
non-strategic types of decision makers in normal-form games. 
We find that subjects play the Nash equilibrium strategy in about 45% of all cases, with 
no significant differences across the age range from 10- to 17-year olds. The relative 
frequency of equilibrium play is well in the range of 40% to 50% which is the typical finding 
in previous studies with adults (e.g., Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 
2008; Sutter et al., 2013)
1
, indicating that strategic decision making in our subject pool is 
largely similar to the level found for adults. 
                                                 
1 In Sutter et al. (2013) the same games are used as in this study, but  the sequence of eliciting choices, first- 
and second-order beliefs is slightly different from here. The focus in Sutter et al. (2013) is on comparing 
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In addition to eliciting choices in the normal-form games, we also elicit first-order beliefs 
(about the opponent’s choice) and second-order beliefs (about the opponent’s first-order 
belief). The elicitation of beliefs allows us to examine a decision maker’s consistency in two 
ways: (i) We analyze whether a decision maker chooses a best response to the stated first-
order belief. This happens in about 60% of cases. (ii) We examine whether a decision maker 
expects the opponent to act rationally by first-order beliefs being a best response to second-
order beliefs. This happens at a lower level of around 50% of cases. We denote this as the 
opponent’s expected consistency. The analysis of the determinants of consistency reveals that 
the probability of consistent choices (by best replying to first-order beliefs) is significantly 
lower when the opponent player has a dominant strategy. In general, students with better 
grades in mathematics are more likely to act consistently. 
Applying the mixture model of Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), we classify subjects into eight 
different strategic or non-strategic types. While previous literature on the economic behavior 
of children and teenagers has studied game theoretic settings and whether subjects play 
equilibrium (see, among many others, Murnighan and Saxon, 1998, Sutter and Kocher, 2007, 
or Brosig-Koch et al., 2015), no previous paper has classified children’s economic behavior as 
any of eight different types of strategic and non-strategic behavior. This means that we can 
provide a finer-grained picture of strategic (or non-strategic) sophistication of children and 
teenagers, allowing us to study in more detail their reasoning and thinking. We find that the 
majority of our subject pool (almost 60%) can be classified as non-strategic decision makers. 
The modal type is a non-strategic Optimistic type which plays the strategy that maximizes the 
maximum possible payoff in ignorance of the partner’s payoffs. Roughly 40% of subjects are 
classified as strategic. We note a different type distribution between men and women. Men 
are more often (non-strategically) maximizing the total surplus, while women are more likely 
to be a type that eliminates dominated strategies. Age has some weak, gender specific effect 
on the probability to belong to a specific type. Eliminating dominated strategies becomes 
more frequent with age in the female sample, showing that this aspect of strategic thinking 
gets slightly more frequent with age, while maximizing the best possible own payoff – a non-
strategic endeavour – decreases with age for males. The error rates, with which subjects are 
classified to be any of five different strategic or three non-strategic types also differ between 
men and women (with males having significantly lower error rates for two types), and depend 
somewhat on age. We also find that females with better math grades are more likely to be 
                                                                                                                                                        
individual choices to team choices (in an adult subject pool). One of the main results is that teams are more 
strategically sophisticated than individuals. When we refer to this study here, we refer to individual choices only. 
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classified as strategic, indicating that subjects with better analytical skills (in math) behave 
differently in strategic interaction.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we present the experimental 
design. Section 3 reports the experimental results and section 4 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Experimental design 
Our experimental design is based on the 18 normal-form games that were designed by 
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) to study strategic sophistication (see Figure 1). There are 10 “D”-
games in which one of the two players has a strictly dominant strategy and 8 “ND”-games in 
which no player has a dominant strategy. In all games there is a unique pure Nash equilibrium 
that is Pareto-dominated by another strategy combination of row and column players. The 
games can also be classified according to the number of rounds of iterated pure-strategy 
dominance that players need to identify the equilibrium strategy. This refers to a game’s 
complexity. In D-games the number of rounds a player needs to reach his own equilibrium 
choice is either 1 or 2, while in ND-games the corresponding number of rounds may be 2, 3 or 
infinite. Figure 1 illustrates all games’ types, complexities and the order of presentation of the 
specific games to the participants.
2
 The total of 18 games includes eight pairs of isomorphic 
games that are identical for row and column players except for transformation of player roles 
and small, uniform payoff shifts.  
Figure 1 about here 
Each game was played only once and in each game subjects had to make three 
consecutive decisions:
3
 A subject had to (i) choose one of the available strategies (choice), (ii) 
state a first-order belief about the opponent’s action (FOB) and, finally, (iii) state a second-
order belief, i.e., a belief about the opponent’s first-order belief (SOB).4 
                                                 
2 This information can be found in the upper left and right corner of each game in Figure 1. The order of 
games in the experiment is indicated by “game # x”, with x  {1, ..., 18}. (D) refers to D-games and (ND) refers 
to ND-games. Numbers in brackets indicate a game’s complexity for the row and column player, where [xR, yR] 
denotes the number of rounds needed for the row (x) and the column player (y). In italics we denote the strategy 
predicted by the eight different (strategic and non-strategic) types that we are estimating in section 3.4. 
3 Games were presented to all participants in the same order and in a way that they saw themselves as a row 
player (as in Costa-Gomes et al., 2001). The transformation of the column players’ perspective didn’t have an 
influence on the characteristics of the games and was intended to avoid any influence of the kind of presentation 
on behavior. 
4 We elicited point beliefs for two reasons. First, asking for a probability distribution (and paying in an 
incentive compatible way by using, for example, a quadratic scoring rule) was too complicated for our youngest 
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Our subjects didn’t get any feedback until all participants had taken all 54 decisions. This 
was done in order to suppress learning and reputation formation. At the end of the 
experiment, one subject in each pair of players was asked to draw a card from a deck of cards 
showing numbers from 1 to 18. The drawn number determined the game that was relevant for 
payment (for both players). In a next step the subjects learnt about the own and the 
opponent’s choice, first- and second-order beliefs in the particular game. A second card drawn 
by the other subject in each pair of players then determined whether choices (card A), first-
order beliefs (card B) or second-order beliefs (card C) were paid. 
The experiment was run at the “Öffentliche Gymnasium der Franziskaner Hall”, a public 
high school located 5 km east of Innsbruck, the capital of the state of Tyrol in Austria. This 
school teaches children in 8 different grades, in Anglo-Saxon terminology grades 5 to 12. We 
conducted the experiment in grade 5 (10- to 11-year olds), grade 7 (12- to 13-year olds), grade 
9 (14- to 15-year olds), and grade 11 (16- to 17-year olds), with two classes in each grade. 
Table 1 presents the number of subjects in each grade, broken down also by row- and column-
player and by gender. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The sessions in both classes of a given grade were always run simultaneously in two 
separate rooms in order to avoid any potential dissemination of information. Students were 
randomly matched. However, matching never took place within the same class, but we 
matched two subjects from two different classes. Due to the circumstance that class sizes 
were very similar, most participants had exactly one matching partner. If class sizes were 
unequal, we matched a student of the larger class with two students of the smaller class. Of 
course, participants with two matching partners only received payment for the interaction 
with one (randomly determined) partner. Subjects were also informed that the identities 
would be kept strictly confidential toward other participants. In order to guarantee also 
anonymity within a class, we used sliding walls between subjects so that they could not 
observe other subjects’ decisions. 
                                                                                                                                                        
participants. We pre-tested asking for a probability distribution and encountered difficulties in understanding. 
Point beliefs, however, were very easy for subjects to understand. Second, eliciting point beliefs requires 
considerably less time than asking for a probability distribution of beliefs. Given that we already had a 
considerable number of decisions (54) and that the experiment took about 2.5 hours, we opted for the shorter 
elicitation of point beliefs. It is correct that eliciting a probability distribution has some advantages from a 
theoretical point of view, but it was impractical to implement that with our subject pool. Furthermore, Sutter et 
al. (2013) show that asking for a probability distribution can also lead to theoretical problems in studying a 
decision maker’s consistency. 
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Each session was started with an extensive description and training of the game (see the 
instructions in the appendix). Questions were answered in private. Before the start of the 
experiment, each participant had to fill in a control questionnaire that checked the 
understanding of how decisions or beliefs mapped into payoffs. Five subjects (out of 196) did 
not answer all questions correctly. They are excluded in the following, yielding 191 subjects 
for the subsequent analysis.  
The experiment itself was run with paper and pen. We handed out the three decision 
sheets for each game (for choices, first- and second-order beliefs) game by game. That means 
that subjects had to make all three decisions for a particular game before proceeding to the 
next game. After the experiment all participants were asked in a questionnaire to provide 
information about the number of siblings, their current grades in mathematics and German, 
and their ability to play chess (either yes or no). Due to the circumstance that 11 participants 
in grade 7 did not provide all corresponding information, parts of our analysis (in Table 6 and 
Table 7) are based on 180 subjects. 
In total, each session lasted approximately 2.5 hours. The average earnings were about 7 








 grade, and 
subjects were paid in private after the experiment. These earnings were slightly higher than 
the average weekly pocket money of around 5 Euros for 10- to 13-year-olds, and 13 Euros for 
14- to 17-year-olds. The experimental exchange rate (from points to Euros) was contingent on 
subjects’ age. From a survey before running the experiment we knew that subjects in grades 9 
and 11 received on average slightly more than twice as much weekly pocket money as 
subjects in grades 5 and 7. Accordingly, if a subject was paid for her choice, we paid 20 Euro-
Cents per experimental point in grades 9 and 11, and 10 Euro-Cents per point in grades 5 and 









-graders got 5 Euros. Incorrect beliefs 
yielded no payoffs across all grades. Note that all subjects received a show up fee, which was 
4 Euros in grades 9 and 11, and 2 Euros in grades 5 and 7. 
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3. Experimental results5 
3.1. Frequency of choosing and expecting Nash and the complexity of decisions  
Table 2 reports in the upper panel the relative frequencies of particular choices. The 
middle and lower panel illustrate in the same manner first-order and second-order beliefs. The 
first column considers all 18 games, while columns two and three present separate data for D-
games and ND-games. We denote decisions that imply the strategy that leads to the Nash-
equilibrium by “Nash”, decisions that imply the strategy that would yield an outcome that 
Pareto-dominates the Nash-equilibrium by “Pareto” and decisions implying other strategies 
by “Other”. 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
We note that on average Nash is played in 45% of all cases. As becomes clear from  
Table 2 the relative frequency of playing Nash is, in the aggregate, roughly the same across 
all four grades in which we ran the experiment. It ranges from 42% in 11
th
 grade to 48% in 5
th
 
grade, and a Kruskal-Wallis test rejects a significant different across age groups.
6
 
Not surprisingly, the relative frequency of choosing the Nash strategy is clearly higher in 
D-games (62%) than in ND-games (24%). This is also true for each single age group. 
Looking at first- and second-order beliefs we observe that the relative frequency of the Nash 




Table 3 about here 
                                                 
5 All analyses presented in the results section are based on pooled data of row and column players. This is 
justified since there are 16 isomorphic games in the set of 18 games and all decision tasks were presented in a 
way that players saw themselves as row players. Note that all results reported here would also hold if we 
concentrated only on the 16 isomorphic games. 
6 In order to check whether the insignificant result might be due to sample size, we conducted several 
robustness checks. To start with, we note that the sample size would need to be multiplied by a factor of 4.65 to 
get a significant Kruskal-Wallis-test statistic if we assumed that the distribution of choices within each age group 
would remain unchanged. This means that only with a sample size of more than 900 subjects the actually 
observed relative frequencies would be statistically significant, albeit economically small. Second, we calculated 
the power of our test and found that a power of 0.80 for a significance level of α = 0.05 could be achieved with 
our current sample size of N = 191 already if the range of the relative frequency of choosing Nash is less than 9 
percentage points (assuming a mean of 45%). This means that our sample size is large enough to capture 
potential treatment (i.e., age) effects. 
7 This pattern is consistent with a model of noisy introspection by Goeree and Holt (2004) in which they 
predict more noise – and hence less equilibrium play – with higher-order beliefs than with actual play. 
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Table 3 shows how the degree of a game’s complexity affects choices and beliefs. A 
game’s complexity is defined by the type of the underlying game (“ND” or “D”) and the 
number of rounds of iterated pure-strategy dominance required in order to identify the 
equilibrium choice.
8
 The table reports the frequencies of chosen strategies (as in Table 2) 
according to five different categories: D-games with either one or two rounds of iterated pure-
strategy dominance – 1R(D) and 2R(D) – and ND-games with either two, three or an infinite 
number of rounds – 2R(ND), 3R(ND), and ∞R(ND). The first column in the upper panel 
illustrates that in games where the decision maker herself has a dominant strategy, she plays 
Nash in 85% of cases. The likelihood of playing Nash is drastically reduced once a player has 
no longer a dominant strategy (see the four right most columns in Table 3). The middle and 
lower panel of Table 3 refer to first- and second-order beliefs. While Nash remains on average 
at or above 80% in the first column, the other columns show that Nash is considerably less 
often expected (both in first- and second-order beliefs) than actually played in games without 
a dominant strategy for the decision maker. Table 3 shows only little evidence for any age 
effects, as the average choice frequencies are typically very similar across age groups and 
only in a few cells we note significant age differences (according to a Kruskal-Wallis test). 
This observation suggests that strategic decision making is fairly well developed at an age of 
10 years and hardly changes in subsequent years of adolescence. We summarize the findings 
in this subsection as follows: 
Result 1: Overall, the equilibrium strategy is chosen in about 45% of cases. First- and 
second-order beliefs of equilibrium play are significantly less frequent by roughly 10 
percentage points. The relative frequency of playing Nash decreases with a game’s 
complexity, i.e., the number of rounds of iterated pure-strategy dominance needed to identify 
the equilibrium. The share of equilibrium play and expected equilibrium play (Nash first-
order and second-order beliefs) changes hardly between the age of 10 and 17 years.  
 
3.2. Frequency of consistent choices and beliefs 
We define a player’s “own consistency” as the relative frequency of choices that are a 
best response to her own first-order belief in a particular game, and the “opponent’s expected 
                                                 
8 Very similar results are obtained if we consider the number of available strategies as an indicator for a 
game’s complexity. In Table B.1 of the Appendix we present relative choice frequencies of strategies when 
taking the number of strategies in a game as the classification for complexity. 
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consistency” as the relative frequency with which a player’s first-order beliefs are a best 
response to her second-order beliefs. As can be seen from Table 4, the relative frequency of 
“own consistency” ranges from 61% to 64% across all age groups, which is another indication 
that there is hardly any change in strategic decision making from the age of 10 to 17 years. 
The “own consistency” is higher in D-games than in ND-games across all age groups, 
stressing the importance of dominant strategies for consistent behavior. The “opponent’s 
expected consistency” ranges from 51% to 56%. The latter frequency is significantly lower 
than the frequency of “own consistency” (p < 0.05, two-sided Wilcoxon-signed rank tests for 
all pairwise comparisons). 
Inconsistent choices have an expected cost for a particular subject. To see this, consider 
for example that the row-player in game #3 at the top-left corner of Figure 1 plays strategy [1] 
and expects the column player to play strategy [2]. If the expectation was correct, the row-
player’s payoff would be 31, although he could have obtained 55 if he played his strategy [2] 
as a best-response to his expectation. In this way, one can calculate the expected costs of 
inconsistent choices (based on the assumption that first-order expectations would be correct). 
They are 10.12 units on average, and 10.11, 10.65, 9.47, 10.29 in the four different grades (in 
ascending order of grades). The numbers for the different grades are not significantly different 
from each other (Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample tests for equality of distribution 
functions, p > 0.293
9
). 
The same approach can be applied to the opponent’s expected consistency, yielding 
average expected costs of 12.99 units, and 13.49, 13.50, 12.15, 12.86 in the four different 
grades (in ascending order of grades). The numbers for the different grades are, again, not 
significantly different from each other (Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample tests for equality of 




Table 4 and Table 5 about here 
 
Of course, standard game theory does not only assume that subject best respond to their 
beliefs, but more precisely it predicts a combination of Nash equilibrium choices and a belief 
that the opponent also plays Nash. This game theoretically rational behavior is denoted Nash-
                                                 
9 The exact p-values for pairwise comparisons are as follows: 0.908 (5th grade vs. 7th grade), 0.602 (5th grade 
vs. 9th grade), 0.779 (5th grade vs. 11th grade), 0.293 (7th grade vs. 9th grade), 0.724 (7th grade vs. 11th grade), 
0.440 (9th grade vs. 11th grade)  
10 The exact p-values for pairwise comparisons are as follows: 0.769 (5th grade vs. 7th grade), 0.162 (5th grade 
vs. 9th grade), 0.806 (5th grade vs. 11th grade), 0.196 (7th grade vs. 9th grade), 0.946 (7th grade vs. 11th grade), 
0.408 (9th grade vs. 11th grade) 
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consistency (Nash-CON) in the following and analyzed in Table 5. There we also consider 
another type of consistency which appeared very frequently in our data. This rather naive type 
of consistency is called “Maximum-consistency” (Max-CON) and is defined as a combination 
of a player’s choice and first-order belief that results in the maximum available payoff for the 
player (in the case of “own consistency”) or in the maximum payoff for the opponent player 
(in the case of “opponent’s expected consistency”). An important feature of the games we 
employ is that Nash-CON never overlaps with Max-CON since all games have the structure 
of a prisoner’s dilemma, i.e., the Nash-equilibrium is Pareto-dominated. 
Table 5 shows that Nash-CON is observed for own choices in roughly 16% of all cases. It 
is much more frequent in D-games than in the ND-games (p < 0.05, two-sided Wilcoxon 
signed rank tests). Moreover, the share of Nash-CON is higher in the category “own 
consistency” than in the category “opponent’s expected consistency”. At the same time, Max-
CON is observed in roughly 40% of all cases, indicating that subjects are pretty optimistic (by 
expecting the highest possible payoffs from their combination of choices and first-order 
beliefs). We summarize the findings in this subsection as follows: 
Result 2: Choices are a best reply to first-order beliefs in more than 60% of cases, while 
first-order beliefs are a best reply to second-order beliefs in a significantly smaller number of 
cases (less than 56%). Most frequently, consistent choices and beliefs are of the Max-CON 
type, meaning that subjects expect the maximum payoffs to occur. Nash-consistency (playing 
the Nash equilibrium strategy and expecting the opponent to play Nash) is less frequent with 
16% on average (all age groups aggregated), and more likely in D-games than in ND-games. 
We observe no significant differences across age groups. 
 
3.3. Determinants of consistent decisions 
In this section we examine in more detail what are important determinants of consistent 
decision making in normal form games, i.e., of behavior where choices are best responses to 
first-order beliefs or where first-order beliefs are best responses to second-order beliefs. Of 
course, if a player has a dominant strategy – as one player always has in our D-games – then 
the optimal choice is independent of any belief, and hence we exclude all cases in which a 
player has a dominant strategy. Note, however, that we keep those cases for the analysis in 
which one player faces an opponent with a dominant strategy, because in this case 
expectations obviously matter. 
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Table 6 about here 
 
Table 6 reports the results of a probit estimation
11
 of a player’s “own consistency” on the 
independent variables “ability to play chess”, “math grade”, “German grade”12, “existence of 
siblings” (as a dummy variable) and five other factors which are explained in the following: 
The dummy variable “opponent dominant strategy” captures the cases where the opponent 
player has a dominant strategy. The next three independent variables (“7th grade”, “9th grade”, 
“11th grade”) are dummies for the different grades that were included in our experiment (with 
5
th
 graders as the benchmark) and the variable “# of possible outcomes” is calculated by 
multiplying the number of strategies for player A by the number of strategies for player B to 
capture potentially more demanding games for cognitive workload (which might be 
negatively related to consistency of choices and beliefs).  
The estimation shows that a player’s ”own consistency” is mainly influenced by the 
existence of a dominant strategy for the opponent and (marginally) by the person’s 
performance in mathematics assessed by her corresponding grade. A dominant strategy for 
the opponent player leads to a significantly lower likelihood of “own consistency”. Due to the 
circumstance that a dominant strategy reduces the complexity of a game to its lowest possible 
degree the negativity of the corresponding correlation is surprising at first sight. A further 
analysis of this result indicates a lack of basic strategic thinking which can be explained as 
follows: Experimental participants were expecting the opponent to play his dominant strategy 
in more than 86% of all cases where the opponent had a dominant strategy (see Table 3). 
Obviously, many participants were able to detect an opponent’s dominant strategy when 
being asked for their first-order belief, but unable to integrate this insight into their own 
decision making process by choosing a best reply. Additionally our analysis in Table 6 
reveals a significant influence of the math grade, i.e., children and adolescents with better 
grades have a higher probability to be consistent. Note that lower grades indicate better 
performance in Austrian schools. All other independent variables in Table 6 have no 
significant impact on “own consistency”.  
 
Table 7 about here 
                                                 
11 In our probit estimations (Tables 6 and 7) standard errors are clustered on the decision maker, since each 
decision maker had to make decisions in all 18 games. 
12 Both the math grade and the German are coded such that lower grades indicate better performance. 
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In Table 7 we present a probit regression in which we use the same independent variables 
as in the previous regression (Table 6), but take the “opponent’s expected consistency” as the 
dependent variable. We again find that the “opponent’s expected consistency” is significantly 
influenced by the existence of a dominant strategy for the player and by the player’s grade in 
mathematics. Our results show that a dominant strategy for the player himself reduces the 
likelihood of consistent expectations whereas a relatively good grade in math increases it. 
Additionally we observe some significant effects related to our age groups in which the 
probability of the “opponent’s expected consistency” is significantly higher for 9th graders 
(compared to 5
th
 graders). Finally, our analysis in Table 7 shows a significant and positive 
influence of the German grade, which means that children and adolescents with better grades 
state consistent expectations for their opponent with a lower probability.  
Result 3: The likelihood of consistent decision making significantly increases with better 
grades in mathematics. Furthermore the probability of a player’s “own consistency” 
(“opponent’s expected consistency”) is significantly lower when his opponent has a dominant 
strategy (the player has a dominant strategy). We find some influence of age and German 
grades on “opponent’s expected consistency”. 
 
3.4. Non-randomness of decisions 
Before turning to the estimation of strategic and non-strategic types, we address whether 
the choices analyzed so far might have been simply the result of random play of subjects. We 
start with the relative frequency of subjects playing the Nash-strategy. It is important to stress 
that random play would lead to a relative frequency of Nash-play of 43%, which is, at first 
sight, very close to the actually observed 45% (see Table 2). This is no indication of random 
play of our subjects, however. Indeed, we can compute the distribution of relative frequencies 
of playing Nash under the assumption of random play, thus calculating the relative 
frequencies of observing 0, 1, 2, …, 17, 18 Nash-choices in case of random play.13 Figure 2 
shows the results for this calculation (the bell-shaped thick curve) and compares it to the 
                                                 
13 The theoretical distribution is computed as follow. We assume that in each game, each possible choice is 
taken with equal probability so that each possible combination of the 18 choices can happen with equal 
probability. Then the probability to observe an individual choosing   Nash choices (with x ranging from zero to 
18) is given by the ratio between the number of all combinations with   choices with the total number of 
combinations. Given that individuals take the decisions independently, this distribution corresponds to the 
relative frequencies to take   Nash-choices under random behavior. 
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actually observed relative frequencies of playing Nash (on the individual level), separate for 
the four different age groups. We note that a Kolmogorov-Smirnov one sample test reveals 
that the actually observed distribution is significantly different from the theoretical 
distribution for the case of pure random play (p < 0.01), thus rejecting the notion that play is 
random. The same holds true if we look (in the aggregate) at choices, first- and second-order 
beliefs in Figure 3. Again, the theoretically predicted distribution of relative frequencies is 
markedly different from the actually observed distributions. 
 
Figure 2 to 5 about here 
 
In Figure 4 and 5 we repeat the same exercise to show that also the likelihood of 
consistent choices (where choices are best responses to first-order beliefs; see Figure 4; or 
where we also consider the opponent’s consistency; see “fob” in Figure 5) cannot be 
explained by random behavior of our participants. The distribution of expected relative 
frequencies of consistent choices (from zero to 18) is significantly different from the 
distribution that has been actually observed in single age groups (Figure 4) or in the aggregate 
(Figure 5). 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
Table 8 shows the p-values of Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sample tests about the 
differences between the two distributions (the theoretical one vs either the observed of Nash 
choices or Best reply or Nash consistent choices). All tests are conducted for the aggregate of 
observations and for each age group separately. The results show that the null-hypothesis of 
random choice of our participants can be rejected. Further evidence that behavior is not 
random will come from the estimation of the error rate model that is presented in the next 
subsection. 




3.5. Estimation of strategic and non-strategic types 
In the following we present a maximum likelihood error-rate analysis of players’ choices 
following the framework of Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). It is a mixture model in which each 
player’s type is drawn from a common prior distribution over eight types and where the type 
is assumed to be constant for all 18 games. The eight different types can be classified into 
non-strategic and strategic types and are defined as follows:
14
 
Non-strategic types: (1) An Altruistic type makes an attempt to maximize the sum of 
both players’ payoffs, implicitly assuming that the opponent is also Altruistic (see Costa-
Gomes et al., 2001). Note that Efficiency-loving would probably be a more appropriate term 
for such a type. Hence, we will call this type Altruistic/Efficiency-loving. (2) A Pessimistic 
type plays maximin, thus is taking choices that secure him the best of all worst outcomes. (3) 
An Optimistic type chooses the strategy that maximizes the best possible own payoff, thus 
ignoring the incentives of the opponent player. As noted by Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), it is 
impossible to distinguish an Optimistic type from a Naïve type in the 18 games used here. A 
Naïve type assigns equal probabilities to the opponent’s strategies and best responds to this 
naïve belief. While a Naïve type might reflect strategic decision making with diffuse beliefs, 
Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) describe Naive types as non-strategic. We follow their approach, 
but talk about Optimistic types, which are non-strategic for sure. 
Strategic types: (4) Type L2 is choosing a best response to Optimistic types. (5) Type D1 
plays best reply to a uniform prior over the opponent’s remaining strategies after applying one 
step of deleting strategies that are dominated by pure strategies. (6) Type D2 goes one step 
further in deleting dominated strategies. After applying two steps of deleting dominated 
strategies he chooses a best reply to the opponent’s remaining strategies. (7) An Equilibrium 
type takes equilibrium choices (which are unique in our games). (8) Choices of a 
Sophisticated type are based on the actually observed distribution of strategies in the 
experiment’s subject pool (i.e., his age group). A player of this type takes this distribution as a 
probability distribution for his opponent’s choice and plays best reply to this information. 
Figure 1 includes in italic font information on which decisions should be taken (or 
expected in the case of the belief determination) by row and column players if they act 
according to a certain theoretical type (as explained in the previous two paragraphs).  
For the estimation of the mixture model let i = 1, . . . , N index the different players, let k 
= 1, . . . , K index our types, and let c = 2, 3, or 4 be the number of a player’s possible 
                                                 
14 We follow Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) in the selection of types to be considered. As they indicate, the 
definition of types is largely based on earlier work by Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995). 
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decisions in a given game. We assume that player i of type-k normally makes type k’s 
decision, but in each game he makes an error with probability     ,   -, type k’s error rate, 
in which case he takes each of his c decisions with probability 1/c. The probability of type k’s 
decision is then   
   
 
   . So the probability of any single non-type k decision is  
   
 
. We 
assume errors are independently and identically distributed across games and are 
independently distributed across players. Moreover we assume that individual error rates 
depend on a set {  } of observable exogenous variables, following the specification: 
    
     ∑        
 
   
       ∑        
 
   
       *     + 
where     denotes the observed value of variable    for player i and     are exogenous 
parameters that take into account the effect of variable    on the error rate    .
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Let     denote player i’s common prior k-type probability where ∑    
 
     . We 
assume that player i’s common prior k-type probabilities depend on a set {  } of observable 
exogenous variables, following the specification:  
    
 
     ∑        
 
   
  ∑  
     ∑         
 
    
   
       *     +  and     
 
  ∑  
     ∑         
 
    
   
 
where     are exogenous parameters that take into account the effect of variable    on the 
probability    . 
The likelihood function can be constructed as follows. Let T
c 
denote the total number of 




 =6, and T
4
 =1. 
Then let ickx  denote the number of player i’s decisions that equal type k’s in games in which 
he has c decisions, with   
  (  
     
     
  ) ,    (  
      
 ) , and   (       ) . Let 
   (         ),   (       ),    (         ), and   (       ). Given that a game 
has one type-k decision and c-1 non-type-k decisions, the probability of observing a particular 
sample with   
  type-k decisions when player i is type k can be written as: 
   
 (      
 )  ∏ [ -
 - 
 




   
 
]
  -  
  
        (1) 
Weighting the right-hand side by    , summing over k, taking logarithms, and summing 
over i yields the log-likelihood function for the entire sample: 
                                                 
15 Checking the influence of observable exogenous variables on the error rates is motivated by the fact that 
looking at errors can be informative for understanding human behavior (see Jacobson and Petrie, 2009, for 
instance, who show that in a risky choice task, those making mistakes – by being inconsistent – are also more 
likely to make suboptimal decisions) and that previous research has shown that error rates in these kinds of 
mixed-type models are often not uniformly distributed (see, von Gaudecker et al., 2011, for example). 
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    (     )  ∑   ∑      
 (      
 )    
 
    (2) 
We estimate this model using the following exogenous variables: age, gender, an 
interaction variable between gender and age and the grades in German and math. By this 
specification the model has 90 parameters
16
 that we can use to estimate the marginal effects of 
age, gender and grades in German and math on the prior type-k probabilities and on the error 
rates. Results are summarized in Tables 9 and 10 that report, separated by gender, the 
estimated error rates and prior type-k probabilities at the average of the exogenous variables 
(Table 9) and the marginal effects of the exogenous variables on prior type-k probabilities and 
the error rates (Table 10).
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Table 9 and Table 10 about here 
 
Table 9 reveals that the modal type for both groups is the Optimistic with a share of 41% 
for males and 54% for females and that 41% of males and 38% of females are of one of the 
strategic types, but these differences across gender are not significant.  
We note a different type distribution between males and females, though. Three types are 
significantly represented in both groups and they are Pessimistic, Optimistic and D1. The 
types Altruistic/Efficiency-loving, Sophisticated and L2 are significant only in the male 
sample, while Equilibrium is significant only in the female group. Furthermore males are 
significantly more probable to be Altruistic/Efficiency-loving or L2 and less probable to be 
D1 than females. Finally even if there are no significant differences between males and 
females in the estimated probability to be one of strategic types, we note that the most 
frequent strategic type is L2 for males, but D1 for females.  
The estimated error rates are almost all significantly different from one (that corresponds 
to random choice) with the exception of type D2 (that is not significant in the whole sample, 
                                                 
16 We estimated a more parsimonius model where the error rate is the same across types (48 parameters). 
Both Akaike information criterion and Bayesian information criterion indicate that the model with more 
parameters is preferred. 
17 Note that subjects have to choose one of the 5,971,968 (= 211·36·4) possible combinations of choices in the 
18 games. Our eight behavioral types imply eight out of almost 6 million combinations. It is noteworthy that 38 
out of 191 subjects have all 18 decisions consistent with one of these eight behavioral types. This is a remarkable 
fraction of 20% of subjects. Yet, given that 80% of subjects do not conform in all 18 decisions to one specific 
type, this justifies the use of our mixture model that allows for errors and different types, and in this subsection 
we estimate the likelihood of different behavioral types. Another approach would be to estimate each behavioral 
model separately and then test which has the best fit with our data. Such an approach would assume that we look 
for one specific type that best describes our full sample (in fact, this would be the Naïve type). Yet, we do not 
report the results of such an exercise because – like the literature following Costa-Gomes et al. (2001) – we 
believe that the mixture model presented here is the more appropriate approach to capture the heterogeneity of 
behavioral types. 
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however) and the Equilibrium type for females (see symbol 
+
 in Table 9). There is some 
difference between males and females in the error rates of Optimistic and Equilibrium types, 
with males characterized by lower error rates. 
Table 10 shows that age has some weak impact on the probability to be a certain type that 
is gender specific: the probability to be D1 is increasing with the age in the female group 
while that to be Optimistic is decreasing with age in the male group. Finally, we also note that 
the probability to be one of the strategic types has a positive coefficient for age, but it is not 
significant. Concerning the influence of grades we find that females with better math grades 
are more likely to be classified as strategic. 
Age does have an impact on some of the error rates. For non-strategic types, for males 
this effect is significantly positive for Altruistic/Efficiency-loving and Pessimistic types, 
while for females it is negative for the Pessimistic type only. For strategic types, age has a 
negative impact on the error rate of L2, but this effect is significant only for males.Result 5: 
The likelihood of subjects to be of any of five different strategic types (Equilibrium, 
Sophisticated, D1, D2, L2) is about 40%. The modal type, however, is a non-strategic 
Optimistic type. Males are significantly more often an Altruistic/Efficiency-loving or L2 type 
and less often a D1 type than females. Age has a positive effect on the probability of a female 
to be a D1 type and a negative effect on the probability of a male to be an Optimistic type. 




In this paper we have studied strategic sophistication of 191 adolescents, aged 10 to 17 
years, in 18 different normal-form games taken from Costa-Gomes et al. (2001). Overall, we 
have found that about 40% of subjects can be classified as strategic, thus taking into account 
their opponent’s incentives and strategies when making decisions.  
Interestingly, we have found at best a weak influence of age on the likelihood to be a 
strategic type. The estimated coefficient, while positive, is insignificant. In fact, many of the 
stylized facts found in our experiment with teenagers are very similar to what is known from 
experiments with university students in their early 20ies. It is particularly noteworthy that in 
Sutter et al. (2013) it has been estimated for adults that 40% of subjects are classified as 
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strategic types, a fraction that is obviously not significantly different from the share of 
children and teenagers classified as strategic in the experiment presented here. Moreover, the 
relative frequency of playing Nash in the 18 different games is approximately 45% in our 
subject pool, which is well in the range of 40% to 50% of Nash-play reported in other studies 
(e.g., Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker, 2008; Danz et al., 2012; Sutter 
et al., 2013). The share of consistent decisions – as best response to one’s own beliefs – is 
around 60% in our sample, while it is around 55% both in Costa-Gomes and Weizsäcker 
(2008) and Sutter et al. (2013) who have run their experiments with university students. 
Hence, teenagers and young adults in their early 20ies play normal form games in a very 
similar manner. This finding is also consistent with evidence from Brosig-Koch et al. (2015) 
about the development of the ability to use backward induction in a race game. While they 
have found an effect of age below the age of 10, in the teenage years they have not observed 
any further development with age, which is in line with what we observe about strategic 
sophistication. We do find a slight effect of age on the error rates with which experimental 
participants are classified into different (strategic and non-strategic) types. However, the 
estimations about the error rates do not provide a compelling pattern. For instance, for some 
types we find an increase in error rates with age, for others a decrease. 
While our paper contributes to the literature on strategic sophistication by showing that 
adolescents are able to play complex games in a way that is very similar to the behavior of 
adults (university students) and that age has no marked impact on strategic behavior, another 
contribution to this literature refers to the analysis of consistent decision making. Our 
corresponding analyses include both game characteristics (such as the existence of dominant 
strategies or the number of available strategies) and players’ individual characteristics (such 
as grades or the existence of siblings). In this context, our results (in section 3.3) have 
revealed that students with better grades in math have a significantly higher probability to 
state consistent choices and beliefs. 
Given our results, one straightforward extension of our study would be to study also 
subjects who are younger than 10 years of age in order to determine whether and when 
noticeable changes in the ability to act and think strategically develop. Our experimental 
design is most likely not the optimal choice for younger children below the age of 10 years, 
because the games used in our study and the decisions on first- and second-order beliefs 
might easily overburden younger children. While we have chosen our design due to its 
suitability for studying different types of strategic and non-strategic behavior and because a 
lot of evidence from college or university students in their early 20ies is available for 
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comparison, we regard it as an interesting avenue for future research to design simpler games 
that could provide insights into how strategic sophistication, and the interaction of choices 
and beliefs, develops in the first ten years of human life. Such an endeavor will shed further 
light on the origins of game-theoretic thinking in humans. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1: Absolute numbers of subjects across age groups 
     Players’ Types                Gender 
 
Total Row Column Male Female not reported 
5th grade 45 23 22 24 21 0 
7th grade 52 28 24 20 21 11 
9th grade 52 28 24 22 30 0 
11th grade 42 23 19 25 17 0 
Sum 191 102 89 91 89 11 




Table 2: Choices and beliefs of adolescents (relative frequencies in %) 
 All games D-games ND-games 
        
CHOICES 
Nash 5th grade 47.90 64.67  26.94  
Nash 7th grade 45.62 62.12 25.00  
Nash 9th grade 45.83 63.08 24.28 
Nash 11th grade 41.53 59.05 19.64 
Nash overall 45.31 62.31 24.08 
        
Pareto 5th grade 43.58 31.56 58.61 
Pareto 7th grade 46.80 35.38 61.06  
Pareto 9th grade 46.05 33.85 61.30 
Pareto 11th grade 50.40 38.33 65.48  
Pareto overall 46.63 34.71 61.52 
        
Other 5th grade  8.52  3.78 14.44 
Other 7th grade  7.59  2.50 13.94 
Other 9th grade  8.12  3.08 14.42 
Other 11th grade  8.07  2.62 14.88 
Other overall  8.06  2.99 14.40 
FIRST-ORDER BELIEFS 
Nash 5th grade 34.81 51.33 14.17  
Nash 7th grade 33.01 49.23 12.74 
Nash 9th grade 34.83 51.92 13.46 
Nash 11th grade 34.26 51.67 12.50 
Nash overall 34.20 50.99 13.22 
        
Pareto 5th grade 57.16 46.44 70.56 
Pareto 7th grade 59.94 48.46 74.28 
Pareto 9th grade 57.05 45.19 71.88 
Pareto 11th grade 57.14 44.76 72.62 
Pareto overall 57.88 46.28 72.39 
        
Other 5th grade  8.03  2.22  15.28 
Other 7th grade  7.05  2.31 12.98 
Other 9th grade  8.12  2.88 14.66 
Other 11th grade  8.60  3.57 14.88 
Other overall  7.91  2.72 14.40 
SECOND-ORDER BELIEFS 
Nash 5th grade 37.90 51.33  21.11* 
Nash 7th grade 32.59 48.27 12.98 
Nash 9th grade 34.19 49.62 14.90 
Nash 11th grade 34.26 50.48 13.99 
Nash overall 34.64 49.84 15.64 
        
Pareto 5th grade 55.31 46.00 66.94 
Pareto 7th grade 59.30 49.04 72.12 
Pareto 9th grade 56.52 47.50 67.79 
Pareto 11th grade 57.01 46.67 69.94 
Pareto overall 57.10 47.38 69.24 
        
Other 5th grade  6.79  2.67  11.94* 
Other 7th grade  8.12   2.69 14.90 
Other 9th grade  9.30  2.88 17.31 
Other 11th grade  8.73  2.86 16.07 
Other overall  8.26  2.77 15.12 
** (*) significant difference at p < 0.05 (p < 0.1) across all age groups for a particular set of 
games and a given strategy according to a two-sided Kruskal-Wallis test. 
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Table 3: Complexity of the game, choices and beliefs (relative frequencies in %) 
Complexity (game type)a 1R (D) 2R (D) 2R (ND) 3R (ND) ∞R (ND) 
CHOICES 
Nash 5th grade 89.78 39.56  38.89   8.88  30.00 
Nash 7th grade 86.15 38.08 35.58  7.69 28.37 
Nash 9th grade 83.46 42.69 36.54  7.69 26.44  
Nash 11th grade 81.90 36.19 28.57  8.33 20.83  
Nash overall 85.34 39.27 35.08  8.11 26.57 
       
Pareto 5th grade  6.22 56.89  61.11  42.22** 65.56  
Pareto 7th grade 11.15 59.62  64.42 45.19 67.31 
Pareto 9th grade 15.00 52.69 63.46 55.77  62.98 
Pareto 11th grade 16.19 60.48 71.43 47.62 71.43 
Pareto overall 12.14 57.28 64.92 47.91 66.62 
       
Other 5th grade  4.00  3.56  0.00 48.89**  4.44 
Other 7th grade  2.69  2.31   0.00 47.12  4.33 
Other 9th grade  1.54  4.62  0.00 36.54 10.58 
Other 11th grade  1.90  3.33  0.00 44.05  7.74  
Other overall  2.51  3.46  0.00 43.98  6.81 
FIRST-ORDER BELIEFS 
Nash 5th grade 87.11 15.56 14.44  13.33 14.44 
Nash 7th grade 87.69 10.77 15.38 10.58 12.50 
Nash 9th grade 86.54 17.31 15.38  7.69 15.38 
Nash 11th grade 86.67 16.67 11.90  5.95 16.07 
Nash overall 87.02 14.98 14.39  9.42 14.53 
       
Pareto 5th grade 12.00 80.89  85.56 42.22* 77.22 
Pareto 7th grade 10.00 86.92 84.62 46.15 83.17 
Pareto 9th grade 11.54 78.85 84.62 55.77 73.56 
Pareto 11th grade  9.52 80.00  88.10 47.62 77.38 
Pareto overall 10.78 81.78 85.61 48.17 77.88 
       
Other 5th grade  0.89  3.56  0.00 44.44
   8.33* 
Other 7th grade  2.31  2.31  0.00 43.27  4.33 
Other 9th grade  1.92   3.85  0.00 36.54 11.06 
Other 11th grade  3.81  3.33  0.00 46.43  6.55 
Other overall  2.20  3.25  0.00 42.41  7.59 
SECOND-ORDER BELIEFS 
Nash 5th grade 77.78 24.89* 20.00 22.22** 21.11 
Nash 7th grade 82.69 13.85 13.46   8.65 14.91  
Nash 9th grade 77.69 21.54 11.54  8.65 19.71 
Nash 11th grade 85.71 15.24   9.52  8.33 19.05 
Nash overall 80.84 18.85 13.61 11.78 18.59 
       
Pareto 5th grade 18.67 73.33 80.00 44.44  71.67 
Pareto 7th grade 15.00 83.08 86.54 46.15 77.88 
Pareto 9th grade 20.38 74.62 88.46 50.00 66.35 
Pareto 11th grade 11.43 81.90 90.48 45.24 72.02 
Pareto overall 16.54 78.22 86.39 46.60 71.99 
       
Other 5th grade  3.56  1.78   0.00 33.33*  7.22 
Other 7th grade  2.31  3.08  0.00 45.19  7.21 
Other 9th grade  1.92  3.85  0.00 41.35 13.94 
Other 11th grade  2.86  2.86  0.00 46.43  8.93 
Other overall  2.62  2.93  0.00 41.62  9.42 
** (*) significant difference at p < 0.05 (p < 0.1) across all age groups for a particular set of games and a given 
strategy according to a two-sided Kruskal-Wallis test. 
a The columns separate behavior according to (i) the different number of rounds (R) of iterated pure-strategy 
dominance a player needs to identify the own equilibrium choice, and (ii) the presence (D) or absence (ND) of a 
dominant strategy in the game. 
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Table 4: Consistency of decisions (relative frequency of best reply) 
  All games D-games ND-games 
     
Own consistency 5
th
 grade 64.44 67.78 60.28 
Choice is best reply to first- 7th grade 61.47 64.32 57.93 
order belief 9th grade 64.42 68.27 59.62 
 11th grade 60.85 64.05 56.85 
 Overall 62.84 66.15 58.71 
     
Opponent’s expected  5th grade 50.99 55.78 45.00 
consistency 7
th
 grade 51.99 53.42 50.24 
First-order belief is best  9th grade 55.98 60.00 50.96 
reply to second-order belief 11th grade 51.59 55.24 47.02 
 Overall 52.75 56.17 48.49 
** (*) significant difference at p < 0.05 (p < 0.1) across all age groups for a particular set of games and 





** (*) significant difference at p < 0.05 (p < 0.1) across all age groups for a particular set of games and a 
given strategy according to a two-sided Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 
  
Table 5: Relative frequency of consistency-types Nash-CON and Max-CON 
  All games D-games ND-games 
         
 Nash-CON 5th grade 15.56 23.78  5.28 
 Nash-CON 7th grade 14.55 21.60  5.77 
 Nash-CON 9
th
 grade 18.38 27.69  6.73 
 Nash-CON 11
th
 grade 15.48 24.76  3.87 
Player’s Nash-CON overall 16.04 24.47  5.50 
own      
consistency Max-CON 5
th
 grade 40.99 42.00 39.72 
 Max-CON 7
th
 grade 39.77 41.37 37.74 
 Max-CON 9
th
 grade 38.03 37.69 38.46  
 Max-CON 11
th
 grade 37.70 36.43 39.29 
 Max.CON overall 39.13 39.43 38.74 
      
 Nash-CON 5th grade 10.13** 14.67**  4.44 
 Nash-CON 7
th
 grade   6.22  9.32  2.40 
 Nash-CON 9th grade 11.22 16.92  4.09 
 Nash-CON 11th grade   8.99 12.86  4.17 
Expected Nash-CON overall   9.11 13.43  3.73 
consistency     
of opponent Max-CON 5
th
 grade 37.90 39.56 35.83 
 Max-CON 7
th
 grade 42.34 42.54 42.07 
 Max-CON 9
th
 grade 40.92 40.58 41.35 
 Max-CON 11
th
 grade 39.29 40.71 37.50 
 Max.CON overall 40.24 40.90 39.40 
 28 
 
Table 6: Determinants of a player’s “own consistency” 
Variable Coefficient Std. error p-value 
    
opponent dominant strategy -0.296 0.056 0.000 
dummy for 7th grade 0.095 0.168 0.571 
dummy for 9th grade 0.204 0.165 0.214 
dummy for 11th grade 0.019 0.158 0.907 
# of possible outcomes 0.024 0.022 0.266 
ability to play chess -0.101 0.110 0.356 
math grade -0.108 0.061 0.078 
German grade 0.053 0.063 0.401 
existence of siblings 0.007 0.048 0.880 
Constant 0.214 0.195 0.273 
Probit model with a player’s “own consistency” as dependent variable. 
N = 2.340; standard errors clustered for the 180 decision makers (45 in 5th grade, 41 in 7th 
grade, 52 in 9th grade, 42 in 11th grade). 
 
Marginal effects of independent variables 
 Marginal effect Std. error p-value 
opponent dominant strategy -0.117 0.022 0.000 
dummy for 7th grade 0.038 0.066 0.571 
dummy for 9th grade 0.080 0.064 0.214 
dummy for 11th grade 0.007 0.062 0.907 
# of possible outcomes 0.010 0.009 0.266 
ability to play chess -0.040 0.043 0.356 
math grade -0.043 0.024 0.078 
German grade 0.021 0.025 0.401 
existence of siblings 0.003 0.019 0.880 
N =2.340; standard errors clustered for the 180 decision makers (45 in 5th grade, 41 in 7th 
grade, 52 in 9th grade, 42 in 11th grade). 
Note that in this estimation we have excluded cases where a player has a dominant strategy. 
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Table 7: Determinants of a player’s “opponent’s expected consistency” 
Variable Coefficient Std. error p-value 
    
dominant strategy -0.628 0.068 0.000 
dummy for 7th grade 0.068 0.094 0.471 
dummy for 9th grade 0.304 0.120 0.011 
dummy for 11th grade 0.062 0.104 0.554 
# of possible outcomes 0.010 0.028 0.724 
ability to play chess -0.050 0.073 0.490 
math grade -0.118 0.049 0.017 
German grade 0.095 0.049 0.052 
existence of siblings 0.040 0.029 0.168 
Constant -0.163 0.190 0.389 
Probit model with a player’s “opponent’s expected consistency” as dependent variable. 
N = 2.340; standard errors clustered for the 180 decision makers (45 in 5th grade, 41 in 7th 
grade, 52 in 9th grade, 42 in 11th grade). 
 
Marginal effects of independent variables 
 Marginal effect Std. error p-value 
dominant strategy -0.232 0.022 0.000 
dummy for 7th grade 0.026 0.036 0.471 
dummy for 9th grade 0.118 0.047 0.011 
dummy for 11th grade 0.024 0.040 0.554 
# of possible outcomes 0.004 0.011 0.724 
ability to play chess -0.019 0.028 0.490 
math grade -0.045 0.019 0.017 
German grade 0.037 0.019 0.052 
existence of siblings 0.015 0.011 0.168 
N = 2.340; standard errors clustered for the 180 decision makers (45 in 5th grade, 41 in 7th 
grade, 52 in 9th grade, 42 in 11th grade). 
Note that in this estimation we have excluded cases where the opponent (the player about 














Nash 5th grade 0.10 0.01 0.01 
Nash 7th grade 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Nash 9th grade 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Nash 11th grade 0.10 0.01 0.01 
Nash overall 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    
  OWN OPPONENT’S  
Consistency 5th grade 0.01 0.01  
Consistency 7th grade 0.01 0.01  
Consistency 9th grade 0.01 0.01  
Consistency 11th grade 0.01 0.01  
Consistency overall 0.01 0.01  
    
  OWN OPPONENT’S  
Nash-CON 5th grade 0.05 0.01  
Nash-CON 7th grade 0.01 0.01  
Nash-CON 9th grade 0.01 0.01  
Nash-CON 11th grade 0.05 0.01  
Nash-CON overall 0.01 0.01  
  N=191. 
  Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov one sample tests, comparing the differences  
between the observed distributions and theoretical distributions in case of  
random decision making 






Table 9: Estimated probability pk and error rates    of types  
(at the mean of the exogenous variable) 
 Probabilities Error rates 
 Male Female Difference Male Female Difference 
Altruistic/Efficiency-loving 0.077** 0.004 0.073* 0.053 0.337 -0.284 
Pessimistic 0.104** 0.079** 0.024 0.377 0.258 0.119 
Optimistic 0.411*** 0.541*** -0.130 0.078 0.251 -0.173*** 
Equilibrium 0.026 0.058* -0.032 0.129 0.875+ -0.747*** 
Sophisticated 0.118* 0.031 0.087 0.052 0.000 0.052 
D1 0.082* 0.233*** -0.151** 0.315 0.377 -0.062 
D2 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000+ 1.000+ 0.000 
L2 0.182** 0.054 0.128* 0.416 0.334 0.082 
Sum Strategic types 0.409*** 0.376*** 0.033 - - - 
N=179, Log likelihood = -1635.1764. 
In columns “Difference” we test for gender differences (in a particular row) 
*** (**) [*] significant at 1% (5%) [10%] level 


















Table 10: Marginal effect on type probabilities and error rates 


































































































































































































































































(0.079) - - 
N=179, Log likelihood = -1635.1764. 
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*** (**) [*]  significant at 1% (5%) [10%] level. Note that lower math grades denote higher skills.  
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Figure 1: The 18 normal-form games 
 game # 3 (D) [1R, 2R]    game #  13 (D) [1R, 2R]   
 A, P, O D12, L2, E, S    A, P, O D12, L2, E, S   
A 72, 93 31, 46    D 94, 23 38, 57   
D 84, 52 55, 79   A 45, 89 14, 18   
                  
 game #  1 (D) [2R, 1R]    game #  12 (D) [2R, 1R]   
 D A    D A   
D12, L2, E, S 75, 51 42, 27   A, P, O 21, 92 87, 43   
A, P, O 48, 80 89, 68   D12, L2, E, S 55, 36 16, 12   
                  
 game #  7 (D) [2R, 1R]    game #  11 (D) [2R, 1R]   
  D A    A D   
A, P, O 59, 58 46, 83 85, 61   D12, L2, E, S 31, 32 68, 46   
D12, L2, E, S 38, 29 70, 52 37, 23   P 72, 43 47, 61   
         A, O 91, 65 43, 84   
                  
 game #  9 (D) [1R, 2R]    game #  16 (D) [1R, 2R]   
 D12, L2, E, S A, P, O    D12, L2, E P A, O, S   
 28, 37 57, 58   D 42, 64 57, 43 80, 39   
A 22, 36 60, 84   A 28, 27 39, 68 61, 87   
D 51, 69 82, 45            
                  
 game #  6 (ND) [3R, 2R]    game #  15 (ND) [3R, 2R]   
 A, P, O, S16 D12, L2, E, S10,12,14    A, P, O D12, L2, E, S   
A 53, 86 24, 19   A 76, 93 25, 12   
P, O, D1, L2, S 79, 57 42, 73   D2, E 43, 40 74, 62   
D2, E 28, 23 71, 50   P, O, D1, L2, S 94, 16 59, 37   
                  
 game # 14 (ND) [2R, 3R)    game #  2 (ND) [2R, 3R]   
 A D2, E P, O, D1, D2, S    D2, E A P, O, D1, D2, S   
D12, L2, E, S 21, 26 52, 73 75, 44   A, P, O, S14 42, 45 95, 78 18, 96   
A, P, O 88, 55 25, 30 59, 81   D12, L2, E, S10,12,16 64, 76 14, 27 39, 61   
                  
 game #  8 (ND) [∞R, ∞R]    game #  10 (ND) [∞R, ∞R]   
 O, D12, L2, S A, P E    O, D12, L2, S A, P E   
L2, E, S10,12,16 87, 32 18, 37 63, 76   A, P, O, D12, S14 67, 91 95, 64 31, 35   
A, P, O, D12, S14 65, 89 96, 63 24, 30   L2, E, S10,12,16 89, 49 23, 53 56, 78   
                  
 game #  5 (ND) [∞R, ∞R]    game # 4 (ND) [∞R, ∞R]   
 L2, E, S A, P, O, D12    L2, E, S A, P, O, D12   
E 72, 59 26, 20   A, P 46, 16 57, 88   
A, P 33, 14 59, 92   E 71, 49 28, 24   
O, D12, L2, S 28, 83 85, 61   O, D12, L2, S 42, 82 84, 60   
                  
 game # 17 (D) [1R, 2R]    game # 18 (D) [2R, 1R]   
 D12, L2, E, S A, P, O      A D 
 22, 14 57, 55   A, P, O 56, 58 38, 29 89, 62 32, 86 
 30, 42 28, 37   D12, L2, E, S 15, 23 43, 31 61, 16 67, 46 
A 15, 60 61, 88            
D 45, 66 82, 31            
In italics we denote the strategies of the different strategic or non-strategic types. A … altruistic; P … 
pessimistic; O … optimistic; L2, D1, D2 … strategic types (see section 3.4 in paper); E … equilibrium; S … 
sophisticated (S14 … sophisticated against students in 9th grade; S16 … sophisticated against students in 11th 
grade; S10, 12, 16 … sophisticated against students in 5th, 7th, and 11th grade; S10, 12, 14 … sophisticated against 
students in 5th, 7th, and 9th grade); D12 = D1 and D2; D = dominant strategy. 
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Figure 3: Relative frequency distribution of choosing the Nash-strategy for choices, first- 










































































































































A. Experimental instructions 
 
Instructions were read aloud at the beginning of each session. Before the experiment started, 
all participants had to answer control questions in order to make sure that they understood 
the instructions. Instructions primarily served as a basic guideline for a very detailed 
explanation of the game. As we wanted to be sure that our participants understood the rules 
of the game we took a lot of effort to explain them the instructions in a very detailed way and 
if necessary even personally. Originally all instructions were in German. In the following we 









 graders with 




 graders as a 




 graders in brackets and 
underlined letters.  
 
Welcome! In this game it is very important that you do not communicate with any of your 
class mates for the whole duration of the game. Students who break this rule will be excluded 
from the game. You will earn some money by playing this game which will be paid to you at 
the end of the game. The amount of money you earn strongly depends on your decisions 
during the game. Thus it is very important that you understand the rules of the game. As soon 
as you have any questions, please raise your hand and an instructor of the game will come to 
you in order to answer your questions.  
 
Today we will play a game consisting of 18 sub-games. Each sub-game is printed on a 
separate sheet of paper and consists of three decisions each player needs to make. The rules 
for those three decisions will be explained to you soon. Each player gets 18 sheets on which 
he needs to make his decisions. 
You will play in groups of two students. Each student of this room will be matched with a 
student from another room. In this other room students from your parallel-class play the same 
game right now. The student with the number one in this room will be matched with student 
number one in the other room, student number two in this room will be matched with student 
number two in the other room etc. Same as you did, students in the other room have drawn 
numbers randomly. We take care that each student in this room is paired with a student in the 
other room. In the following we will call the student who is matched with you as “the other 
player” or “your interaction partner”.  
 












In the upper part of each sheet you need to make a decision. In this example you need to 
choose one of two options. The first option (first row) is indicated with the sign § and the 
second option (second row) is indicated with the sign %. Your interaction partner also has two 
options in this example. His options are columns which are always indicated with two signs of 
the same kind. The first option of the other player is indicated with §§ and the second option 
is indicated with %%.  
Based on the row that you have chosen and the column that your interaction partner has 
chosen the potential payment for both players is determined. This is done as follows: The 
table on the left hand side contains four possible payments dedicated to you and measured in 
game points. The table on the right hand side contains four possible payments dedicated for 
the opponent player – again measured in game points. The cell that is relevant for payment is 
dependent on your own decision and on the decision of your interaction partner.  
Let’s assume you choose the row indicated with the sign § and your interaction partner 
chooses the column indicated with the signs §§. In this particular case you would get 65 
points and your interaction partner would get 57 points. Let’s assume another case in which 
you choose the row indicated with the sign % and the other player chooses the column 
indicated with the signs §§. In this case you would get 23 points and your interaction partner 
would get 85 points.  



















In the middle of each sheet we ask you for your opinion about your interaction partner’s 
choice.  
For example if you belief that your interaction partner chooses the column indicated by the 
signs §§ you need to mark the circle above those signs with a cross. If you think that your 
interaction partner chooses the column marked with the signs %% you need to mark the circle 
above the signs %% with a cross. Please note that correct beliefs can result in considerable 
higher payments. 
 




In the lower part of each sheet we ask you for your opinion about your interaction partner’s 
belief regarding your own choice. 
For example if you think that your interaction partner expects you to choose the row indicated 
with the sign § you need to mark the circle next to the sign § with a cross. If you think that 
your interaction partner expects you to choose the row indicated with the sign % you need to 
mark the circle next to the sign % with a cross.  
Please note that correct beliefs can result in considerable higher payments. 
 
In the example illustrated above each player has two options from which he can choose. In 
general there are also games in which one of the two players has not only two, but three or 





Calculation of payments: 
At the end of the whole experiment we will randomly select one specific sub-game which is 
relevant for your payment.  
In order to realize that we provide a deck of cards showing the numbers 1 to 18 from which 
you (or the other player) will be asked to draw one card. The number shown on this card 
determines the  sub-game which is relevant for your payment. 
 
In addition one specific decision will be selected, which in combination with the selected sub-
game will determine your payment. 
 
In this context relevant decisions are: 
 
- which row is your own choice (decision 1) 
- which column chooses your interaction partner according to your opinion (decision 2) 
- which row does your interaction partner pick when he informs about his belief 
regarding your own choice (decision 3) 
 
The random selection of the decision that is relevant for your payment will be realized by 
drawing another card from a deck of three cards showing numbers 1-3.  
 
 
Payment for decision 1: 
 
In the case that the second card you (or the other player) have drawn shows the number 1, you 
and your interaction partner get paid for the first decision. Each point will be converted into 
Euro according to the following exchange rate 
 
1 point = 0.10 Euros (0.20 Euros) 
 
Let’s assume you have chosen § and your interaction partner has chosen %%. In the example 
illustrated before this would mean that you earn 4.7 Euros (9.4 Euros) (0.1 * 47 points) (0.2 * 
47 points) while your interaction partner earns 3.2 Euros (6.4 Euros) (0.1 * 32 points) (0.2 * 
32 points). 
 
Payment for decision 2:  
In the case that the second card you (or the other player) have drawn shows the number 2, you 
and your interaction partner get paid for the second decision. In this case you will get 5 Euros 
(10 Euros) if your prediction of your interaction partner’s choice was correct. If your 
prediction was incorrect you will get no payment in this case.  
 
Payment for decision 3:  
In the case that the second card you (or the other player) have drawn shows the number 3, you 
and your interaction partner get paid for the third decision. In this case you get 5 Euros (10 
Euros) if your prediction of your interaction partner’s expectation (regarding your own 
choice) was correct. If your prediction was incorrect you will get no payment in this case.  
 
In addition to the payments described in the former each participant of the game gets a fixed 







B. Additional Tables 
 
Table B.1: Percentages of decisions that comply with equilibrium, contingent on game-type 















1 round of dominance to identify own equilibrium choice 
  2x2 with dominant decision (#3, #13 // #1, #12) 91.11 85.58 82.69 84.52 
  2x3 with dominant decision (#16 // #11) 93.33 90.38 80.77 83.33 
  3x2 with dominant decision (#9 // #7) 82.22 86.54 88.46 73.81 
  4x2 with dominant decision (#17 // #18) 91.11 82.69 82.69 83.33 
2 rounds of dominance 
  2x2, partner has dominant decision (#1, #12 // #3, #13) 41.11 45.19 45.19 34.52 
  2x3, partner has dominant decision (#7 // #9) 40.00 32.69 40.38 33.33 
  3x2, partner has dominant decision (#11 // #16) 31.11 34.62 36.54 35.71 
  2x4, partner has dominant decision (#18 // #17) 44.44 32.69 46.15 42.86 
  2x3 with 2 rounds of dominance (#2, #14 // #6, # 15) 38.89 35.58 36.54 28.57 
3 rounds of dominance 
  3x2 with 3 rounds of dominance (#6, #15 // #2, #14)  8.88  7.69  7.69  8.33 
No dominance 
  2x3, unique equilibrium, no dominance (#8, #10 // # 4, #5) 43.33 37.50 35.58 30.95 
  3x2, unique equilibrium, no dominance (#4, #5 // #8, #10) 16.67 19.23 17.31 10.71 












1 round of dominance to identify own equilibrium choice 
  2x2 with dominant decision (#3, #13 // #1, #12) 87.78 86.54 89.42 89.29 
  2x3 with dominant decision (#16 // #11) 86.67 98.08 84.62 90.48 
  3x2 with dominant decision (#9 // #7) 82.22 88.46 88.46 80.95 
  4x2 with dominant decision (#17 // #18) 91.11 78.85 80.77 83.33 
2 rounds of dominance 
  2x2, partner has dominant decision (#1, #12 // #3, #13) 15.56 14.42 19.23 16.67 
  2x3, partner has dominant decision (#7 // #9) 26.67 11.54 26.92 16.67 
  3x2, partner has dominant decision (#11 // #16)  0.00  7.69  5.77 11.90 
  2x4, partner has dominant decision (#18 // #17) 20.00  5.77 15.38 21.43 
  2x3 with 2 rounds of dominance (#2, #14 // #6, # 15) 14.44 15.38 15.38 11.90 
3 rounds of dominance 
  3x2 with 3 rounds of dominance (#6, #15 // #2, #14) 13.33 10.58  7.69  5.95 
No dominance 
  2x3, unique equilibrium, no dominance (#8, #10 // # 4, #5) 16.67 19.23 22.12 21.43 
  3x2, unique equilibrium, no dominance (#4, #5 // #8, #10) 12.22  5.77  8.65 10.71 














1 round of dominance to identify own equilibrium choice 
  2x2 with dominant decision (#3, #13 // #1, #12) 80.44 82.69 80.77 91.67 
  2x3 with dominant decision (#16 // #11) 71.11 86.54 69.23 76.19 
  3x2 with dominant decision (#9 // #7) 73.33 82.69 88.46 80.95 
  4x2 with dominant decision (#17 // #18) 75.56 78.85 69.23 88.10 
2 rounds of dominance 
  2x2, partner has dominant decision (#1, #12 // #3, #13) 30.00* 16.35* 27.88* 16.67* 
  2x3, partner has dominant decision (#7 // #9) 28.89 13.46 17.31 23.81 
  3x2, partner has dominant decision (#11 // #16) 15.56 13.46 15.38 11.90 
  2x4, partner has dominant decision (#18 // #17) 20.00  9.62 19.23  7.14 
  2x3 with 2 rounds of dominance (#2, #14 // #6, # 15) 20.00 13.46 11.54  9.52 
3 rounds of dominance 
  3x2 with 3 rounds of dominance (#6, #15 // #2, #14) 22.22**  8.65**  8.65**  8.33** 
No dominance 
  2x3, unique equilibrium, no dominance (#8, #10 // # 4, #5) 22.22 19.23 25.96 29.76 
  3x2, unique equilibrium, no dominance (#4, #5 // #8, #10) 20.00 10.58 13.46  8.33 
** (*) significant difference at p < 0.05 (p < 0.1) across all age groups for equilibrium play in 
a particular set of games according to a two-sided Kruskal-Wallis test. 
 
